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Guidance and Control System (GC) - Comments for malfunction procedure

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

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Comments to Program - GEN

NO

1. TAKE OUT 5 MINUTE LOCK OUT

?

2. UPDATE SPIS WORK - PERMIT INTEGRATED
POINT TO BE RETAINED (LOCAL MANUEVER
DISPLAY)

NO

3. CALL UP N-64 AFTER 6000 - AFTER
71 FLASH.

4. THE PROGRAM PROCEEDS WITH A MANUEVER
IN P-61 W/O A V-33.

5. THE ATTITUDE MANUEVERS ARE SLOPPY
IN GEN.

6. CAN YOU BACK UP A TL IN A RCS
DE-ORBIT

NO

7. P-23 PERMIT CONTINUOUS MARKS
RATHER THAN EXITING THE PROGRAM & STARTING
OVER.

NO

8. DISPLAY V, h, & F DURING LAUNCH


NO

9. VERB 66 TRIES

- CHANGE VERB 67 TO PERIOD

- DO WE NEED V-65

SM2A-03-SC104-(2)
APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK




G&C
MALFUNCTION

SM2A-03-SC104-(2)
APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK

[illegible]


G&C
MALFUNCTION

SM-2A-1539B



New
Layout of
SCS #3
(Rate Card pg 2.)
notes will have
to be renumbered
to include
the addition
of notes from
prev. page.


change to sec 3 (Rete CMD)



SM-2A-1951

See Blue's redraw page

SM2A-03-SC101-(2) APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK



Only one in captivity!
Guard!
Acting!

SWIGER 7

SM2A-03-SC101-(2)
APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK

SYMPTOM	PROCEDURE	REMARKS
A ABNORMAL VEHICLE DYNAMICS (NON-SPS THRUSTING)	<p>1 DIRECT RCS - on (up) SCS CHAN (4) - OFF THC - CW (if G&N) Stabilize SC Can SC be stabilized?</p> <p>2 Isolate direct SCS CHAN (4) - A or B Counter SC rates DIRECT RCS - OFF SCS DIRECT RCS (2) - open cb SCS LOGIC PWR 1/3 & 1/4 - open cb SPS PILOT VLV (2) - open Stabilize SC RHC's neutral SCS CHAN (4) - OFF Rates build up?</p> <p>3 HOT SHORT IN DIRECT SYSTEM</p> <p>4 Isolate affected quads Prpnt isol vlvs - OFF (axis of rotation) ROLL - ALL PITCH - A&C YAW - B&D Turn propellant isolation vlvs on singly to determine if failure is isolatable</p> <p>5 SC CONT at SCS? YES NO G&N TBD</p> <p>6 Unexpected rates or acceleration? YES SCS 1 1 RCS FAILED ON NO</p> <p>7 Maneuver commanded? NO YES</p> <p>8 Limit cycle on edge of deadband? YES SCS 1 1 RCS FAILED ON NO</p> <p>9 Drifts out of deadband? YES SCS 3 9 RATE CMD TROUBLE-SHOOTING ROUTINE NO</p> <p>10 Oscillating and diverging limit cycle? YES SCS 6 1 VEHICLE DYNAMICS OSCILLATING AND DIVERGING NO</p> <p>11 Unexpected translation? YES SCS 3 4 RATE CMD TROUBLE-SHOOTING ROUTINE NO</p> <p>12 With direct? YES SCS 5 1 DIRECT RCS TROUBLE-SHOOTING ROUTINE NO</p> <p>13 With accel cmd? YES SCS 2 1 ACCEL CMD TROUBLE-SHOOTING ROUTINE NO</p> <p>14 With min impulse? YES SCS 4 1 MIN IMP TROUBLE-SHOOTING ROUTINE NO</p> <p>15 In rate cmd? THC SCS 7 1 WITH RHC ABNORMAL VEHICLE DYNAMICS DURING TRANSLATION SCS 3 1 RATE CMD TROUBLE-SHOOTING ROUTINE</p>	<p>V. of C. for the unit</p>

G&C
MALFUNCTION

Basic Date 1 March 1968

Change Date


Page 5-56

SM-2A-1533

661

SM2A-03-SC101-(2)
APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK

NOTE NOT CLEAR what is max on time?



G&C
MALFUNCTION

Will do good in MTVC
Will RHC input and override Rate gyro and into summing amp

does not apply

Basic Date 1 March 1968


Change Date

Page 5-68

SM-2A-1545

SM2A-03-SC101-(2)
APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK

SWIGERT



G&C
MALFUNCTION


Basic Date 1 March 1968

Change Date


Page 6-69

SM-2A-1546


SM2A-03-SC101-(2)
APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK



G&C
MALFUNCTION




LAYOUT



1 IMU TOTAL ATT CAPABILITY SHOULD BE VERIFIED WHEN THE IMU IS AVAILABLE.

SM2A-03-SC 101-(2)
APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK




G&C
MALFUNCTION


Basic Date

1 March 1968



Change Date

Page 5-70






CMC program



① SPS operability dependent upon subsequent investigation

*This is ~~the~~ the regulation to
page 2 of the SPS proc
if the FCM mod is
incorporated on S/C 101
21 Aug 68*



SYMPTOM	PROCEDURE	REMARKS
<p>3 TEMP</p> <p>AMBER</p> <p>LIGHTS WHEN IMU TEMPERATURE IS OUT OF LIMITS, < 126 OR > 134°F</p>	<pre> graph TD 1[1 DSKY RSET BP - PRESS TEMP LIGHT OUT?] -- NO --> 2[2 SWITCH TO SCS • TC - CW OR SC CONT - SCS] 2 --> 3[3 IMU TEMP FAILURE] 1 -- YES --> 4[4 CONTINUE NORMAL OPERATION] </pre>	<p>① IMU TEMPERATURE IS OUTSIDE OF DESIGN LIMITS. HAVE MSPN MONITOR ISS PARAMETERS TO DETERMINE IF IMU IS USABLE.</p> <p>② TRANSIENT ABNORMAL CONDITION</p>
<p>4 GIMBAL LOCK</p> <p>AMBER</p> <p>LIGHTS WHEN MGA > 70°</p>	<pre> graph TD 1[1 IS NO ATT LIGHT ON?] -- YES --> 3[3 IMU HAS ENTERED GIMBAL LOCK] 1 -- NO --> 2[2 • MANEUVER SC TO AVOID GIMBAL LOCK, OR REALIGN IMU (P52) • RSET BP - PRESS] 3 --> 4[4 • WAIT FOR NO ATT - OUT • PERFORM P51 • RSET BP - PRESS] </pre>	<p>① GIMBAL LOCK IS IMMINENT. CAN BE AVOIDED BY MANEUVERING SC.</p> <p>② GIMBAL LOCK HAS TAKEN PLACE. IMU MUST BE REALIGNED.</p>
<p>5 RESTART</p> <p>AMBER</p> <p>LIGHTED BY ANY OF FOLLOWING: PARITY FAIL, RUPT LOCK, TC TRAP, NIGHT WATCHMAN OR VOLTAGE FAIL</p>	<pre> graph TD 1[1 • RSET PB - PRESS RESTART OUT?] -- NO --> 2[2 SWITCH TO SCS • TC - CW OR SC CONT - SCS] 2 --> 3[3 CMC SELF CHECK • REQUEST MSPN TO MONITOR AND EVALUATE CMC PERFORMANCE • V21 N27E - KEY IN • 00010E - KEY IN R1] 1 -- YES --> 4[4 CONTINUE NORMAL OPERATION] </pre>	<p>① CMC MAY BE UNRELIABLE. IMU MAY BE USED AS A BACKUP ATTITUDE REFERENCE.</p> <p>② TRANSIENT ABNORMAL CONDITION</p>
<p>6 TRACKER</p> <p>AMBER</p> <p>LIGHTED BY OPTICS CDU FAILURE.</p>	<pre> graph TD 1[1 • RSET PB - PRESS TRACKER OUT?] -- YES --> 5[5 CONTINUE NORMAL OPERATION] 1 -- NO --> 2[2 MANUAL OPTICS CONTROL • OPTICS MODE - MAN • DRIVE OPTICS WITH HAND CONTROL • RSET PB - PRESS TRACKER OUT?] 2 -- YES --> 5 2 -- NO --> 3[3 OPTICS SHUTDOWN • G/N POWER, OPTICS - OFF] 3 --> 4[4 OPTICS CDU FAILURE] </pre>	<p>① ICDCU'S DRIVING TOO FAST</p> <p>② OPTICS UNRELIABLE. SCT - MAY BE STILL BE USED MANUALLY. ISS AND CMC ARE STILL OPERATIVE. ALTERNATE IMU ALIGNMENT PROGRAMS P53 AND P54 MAY BE USED</p> <p>③ TRANSIENT ABNORMAL CONDITION</p>
<p>7 PROG</p> <p>AMBER</p> <p>LIGHTED BY CMC PROGRAM ALARM OR BY BAD PIPA READING DURING NONTHRUSTING MODES</p>	<pre> graph TD 1[1 IS ALARM CODE DISPLAYED ON DSKY?] -- NO --> 2[2 • VO5 NO9E - KEY IN] 2 --> 3[3 • RECORD ALARM CODE] 1 -- YES --> 3 3 --> 4[4 PROGRAM ALARM] 4 --> 5[5 • FOLLOW PROCEDURE IN TABLE 6-2 FOR INDICATED ALARM CODE] </pre>	<p>① WHEN PROGRAM ALARM IS GENERATED, THE CMC DOES ONE OF FOLLOWING:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. CONTINUES WITH PROGRAM. 2. DOES A RESTART AT A CONVENIENT PRIOR POINT IN PROGRAM.

From
Frank Muscatto
8/19/68
suggestions
for TVC proc
(G&C #1)

COMMENTS TO G&C PROCEDURES FOR 101/103


STEP 1: SHOULD ~~ONLY~~ TURN CHANNEL SWITCHES OFF ONLY IN AFFECTED AXIS. SHOULD EXIT ONLY ON SCS OR G&N CONTROL; NO MTVC.

STEP 2: FOR THE GPI TO GO TO ZERO AFTER SHUTDOWN, THE FOLLOWING MUST HAVE OCCURRED:


1. CMC SHUT THE BURN OFF
2. CREW SHUT THE BURN OFF THEN EXITED PROGRAM

OTHERWISE THE ERROR COUNTER WILL NOT BE ZEROED AND THE TVC ENABLE WILL NOT BE RESET.

ACTION: REWRITE THIS STEP AS FOLLOWS. ASSUME CMC DID NOT TURN ENGINE OFF, NO CMC OR ISS ALARMS.




EXIT STEP 2 ON SCS



12: THE ONLY TRANSFERABLE ITEM, BETWEEN SCS AUTO AND MTVC RATE, IS A RATE GYRO FAILURE, WHICH CAN ONLY BE DETECTED AFTER ENGINE IGNITION. SINCE, PROBABLY THE ENGINE WOULD BE SHUT DOWN AFTER A FAILURE AND NOT RELIGHTED, THE FAILURE RELATIONSHIP STATED IN 13 DOES NOT EXIST.


13 SHOULD BE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS:




G&C

- 1 FDI RATE IND. ABNORMAL


Should select a...
the display.



ERROR COUNTER OR OCCDU OUTPUT CIRCUIT FAILED



*Drawn by
Dennis Bentley
11/1/67*



1 CMC not functional

2 CMC not functional

11-13-67
DLB

SYMPTOM

PROCEDURE

REMARKS

ISS

initiated by:

1 Switch To SCS
• THC - CW
or
• SC CONT - SCS
• Damp Rates

2 IMU Stab Loop Check
• VIGN20E
(Present gimbal angles)
• FDAI-SELECT - 1/2

Are FDAI-1 and
R1, R2, R3 stable?

3 ISS Power Down
• V37E06E
• G&N POWER -
IMU - OFF
• ENTR
• PRO

4 IMU Failure

5 ICDU Read Counter Check
• V40N20E (Zero ICDU's)
• VIGN20E

Does R1, R2, or R3
disagree with FDAI-1
total attitude?

6 ICDU Failure

7 ICDU Error Counter Check
Disable Dap
• V48E 0E
• V46E
Load Error Counters
+00250E, +00250E
+00250E
Do FDAI-1 error needles
deflect half scale?

8 Check PIPA counts
VIG N21E

Is R1, R2 or R3 erratic?

9 PIPA Failure

10 Check Caution/Warning
NORMAL/BOOST/ACK - ACK
ISS light still on?

11 C/W Failure

12 Continue Normal operation

① IMU not functional

② IMU may be used as attitude reference only

③ GNCS TVC and Entry lost

11-13-67
DLR

*Al Sullivan's
comments to
myself dated 21 Sept 67*

SWIGERT

J.R.B.

10-26-67

COMMENTS ON DG MEMO NO. 947

SYMPTOM 1.

- ✓ (A) CMC SELF TEST SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO ALLOW SELF CONTAINED ON BOARD TROUBLE SHOOTING.
- ✓ (B) BOX 6 IS CANNOT BE RELATED TO BOX 5. NO OPERATION IN STANDBY.
- ✓ (C) EXIT OF YES ON BOX 4 RETURNS TO CMC SYMPTON. LOCK IN "SMALL" CIRCLE.
my comment 3
- ✓ (D) POWER CONSIDERATION CHECK SHOULD BE FIRST.
- ✓ (E) GENERALLY IF RUPT LOCK, TC TRAP, OR PARITY FAIL IS CAUSE, THE CMC WILL IN SOME CASES BE LOCKED UP. HOW IS CMC TROUBLE SHOOT IN THIS CASE?
Can this happen?

2. THE ISS MODE IN WHICH THE ISS FAILURE LIGHT COMES ON DETERMINES THE ISS INITIAL TROUBLE SHOOTING STATUS. ICDU PROBLEMS COULD IMPACT COARSE ALIGNMENT BUT HAS NO IMPACT ON NORMAL ISS STABLE LOOP OPERATION. ISS CAN PROVIDE A GOOD REF. WITH ICDU FAILURES!

J. R. P.
10-26-67

3. A. TRACKER FAIL MEANINGLESS TO
APOLLO. (OCDU FAILURE) *this refers to Rens Radar
fail on U1.*

B. IF FAILURE IS C/W, WHAT IS
ALTERNATE MEANS OF MONITORING
PGNS INDICATION,

5. GIMBAL LOCK LIGHT INDICATION
AND TRUE IMU GIMBAL LOCK ARE
DIFFERENT. DIFFERENCES SHOULD BE
EXPLAINED.

6. A. CMC SELF TEST SHOULD BE EXPANDED
TO ALLOW SELF CONTAINED ON BOARD
TROUBLE SHOOTING.

B. ALSO CAUSED BY PROGRAM ALARM.

7. ~~A. Ref. 3-A ABOVE.~~ *yes,*

valid
B. WHAT TO DO IF FAILURE
LIGHT COMES ON DURING TVC
MODES.

*not valid
too many & complicated
to mention*
C. WHAT CONDITIONS TURN ON LIGHT.

*separate
symptom
MSP*
D. WHAT ABOUT MANUAL OPTICS
DRIVE FAILURES.

00112 WHAT IF IN CMC MARK PROGRAM?

J.R.P.
10-26-67

ADDITIONAL FAILURE CONDITIONS THAT SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY MIT AND INCORPORATED INTO MALFUNCTION DIAGRAMS IF APPLICABLE.

NOTE: IT IS NAR'S UNDERSTANDING THAT FAILURES IN "ANY" OF THE DAP WILL NOT GENERATE A FAILURE ~~QUE~~QUE.

1. FAILURES IN OCOU'S DAC THAT RESULT IN A MAX $\pm 5V$ OUTPUT TO THE SCS SERVO AMP.

RESULT: G&N AUTO TVC NOT OPERABLE, BUT G&N CAN STILL BE USED FOR POWERED NAVIGATION AND TO PROVIDE ERROR SIGNALS TO THE FDAI FOR MTVC.

2. FAILURE IN OUTPUT CHANNELS 5 & 6 GIVING A CONSTANT JET COMMAND.

CORRECTION: DISABLE JET USING CHANNEL SWITCHES. RECALL R03 AND DISABLE RELATED QUAD.

3. FAILURE IN INPUT CHANNELS 31 AND 32 OF CMC. (ACTS LIKE A ROTATION, TRANSLATION OR MIN. IMPULSE ~~CONTROL~~ CONTROL INPUT OR LACK OF RESPONSE TO INPUT.)

CORRECTION: DETERMINE CONTROL MODE OPERABLE AND AVOID ALL FAILURE IMPACTED MODES.

4. RCS JET NOT FIRING WHILE
IN CMC CONTROL MODE. DETERMINED
BY FDAI OR OUT OF WINDOW.

FAIL APPROPRIATE QUAD AND DAP
WILL COMPENSATE FOR THIS BY FIRING
A SINGLE JET LONGER.

5. GENERALLY MIT SHOULD INVESTIGATE
ALL G&N FAILURES THAT COULD
CAUSE SPS GIMBAL HARDOVERS, RCS
JETS ON WITH NO COMMAND OR NO
RCS FIRING WITH A COMMAND. THIS
INFORMATION SHOULD BE REFLECTED
IN MALFUNCTION DIAGRAMS.

6. THE FDAI TOTAL ATTITUDE AND
ATTITUDE ERROR SHOULD BE USED IN
ISS AND ICDU TROUBLE SHOOTING.

JACK,

29 JUL 68

I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE LATEST SM
RCS MALF PROCEDURES LOOK LIKE. I HAVE
THE EDITION THAT WE USED FOR THE FLIGHT
SAFETY REVIEW BOARD. LOOKING AT THOSE,
IT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA TO ADD A REMARK
#14 TO SYMPTOM BLOCK 1d. ~~STATE~~ STATING THAT
THE MANF PRESS MAY INCREASE TO >200 PSI DURING
BOOST & STAY HIGH UNTIL THE SM RCS JETS ARE FIRED.
THIS CONDITION EXISTS BECAUSE THE HC REGS ARE
REFERENCED TO AMBIENT AND ARE LOCKED UP ON
THE GROUND PRIOR TO LAUNCH.

*we call this out
in a remark attached
to a Symptom.*

Ron Ramon
X4371



Jack

I don't know what the latest is
I have produced look like I have
the edition that we used for the flight
I have been looking at those
it must be a good idea to add a remark
to the edition that I am stating that
the main part of the edition is a good one
but I say that when the first part is fixed
this edition is better because the first part
is better than the first part and the first part
the edition is better than the first part

for the
1951

except with V5 N9 E

We will be in the
the first part of the
the first part of the
the first part of the



MAY 24 1968

Herr Swigert:

While tripping through the Malfunction Procedures I came across the following, which you may use as you see fit:

O₂ FLOW HI Step 38 - should be EMER CAB PRESS TO TEST pb push and release. The flow is obviously high while the pb is pushed - the question is does it drop ~~when~~ to normal when the button is released.
we say "push - several times" this should be sufficient

O₂ FLOW LOW - From step 1 - Surge tank pressure low - I suggest going to a box to read cabin pressure. If High, ~~go~~ go to ECS symptom 13; if Low, go to symptom 4. With the present procedure a plumbing leak upstream of the flow rate sensor would cause the operator to start at 2, go to 4, then to 13.
this is changed rather than procedure. we suggest new procedure

SURGE TANK PRESS LOW - A flow restriction (Box 8) would not cause low flow at the Flow Rate Sensor until the Surge Tank is empty. Box's 7 + 9 are therefore unnecessary. I suggest combining low and normal from Box 2 to Box 3 and deleting Box's 7 + 9.

SPS ROUGH ECO - I can't get the story straight yet, but there are apparently some pressure surge in the SPS plumbing that might make it wise to wait 5-6 seconds after a shut down before attempting a restart. As best I ~~think~~ understand it - they don't know what causes the surges and therefore really don't know the effect.

POWER DISTRIBUTION SYMPTOM - Loss of an AC Bus is time critical because of the Fuel Cell Pumps - with the fuel cell under load and with the pumps disabled + are to failure (Flooding) is probably 5 minutes. Perhaps we should have a caution note to this effect somewhere in this procedure to insure that the crew realizes that loss of an AC Bus requires prompt action to protect the fuel cells.

Charlie Harris

R01

NAA feels that the crew should be able to select any program at any time.

The act of selecting a new program by DSKY entry is a conscious deliberate act. Therefore the crew should not be prevented by interlocks from going to a desired program. —

Such interlocks limit the capacity of the crew to use the G & N System.

Al

See pencil note p 237

R-52

NAA explained a situation during the running of R52 that caused a computer lock-up. At card 225 the crew was to switch optics to CMC mode and key in Enter. They inadvertently keyed in Enter first, and the CMC froze. They could get the CMC back on the line by keying in fresh start (V36E) and starting the program all over. They felt there should have been some method of correcting the error and continuing on at that point.

Programs Not Yet Incorporated.

- P01 - Pre-launch Initialization.
- P02 - Gyro Compassing.
- P03 - Optical Verification of Azimuth.
- P04 - Inertial Reference.
- P07 - Systems Test (Non-flight)
- P65 - Up Control.
- P66 - Ballistic.

Routines Not Yet Incorporated.

- R24 Sextant Search.

Program Recommendations

1. Modify RO1
to flash "operator alarm" for
information only. This routine
should not prevent the crew
from going into a desired program
2. Eliminate RO2.
Replace this by checklist items

1060
-101

Propaganda

1. *Propaganda*

to spread "opinion" or
information only. This is
done not against the
from going into a country

2. *Propaganda*

to spread "opinion" or
information only. This is
done not against the
from going into a country

R-50

NAA position was that this routine should be available for manual call up by DSKY entry. If this could be done we could coarse align on selected stars visually.

7
R-50

This routine is not necessary
for manual coarse align. A simpler
way of accomplishing coarse align while
holding some attitude is to use

V

R.O.Z

NAA feels this is an unnecessary routine.

Crew is knowledgeable and trained. This routine could be eliminated, and check list items would suffice, saving space.

R22

NAA felt that the alarm light (card 40) should be deleted because this routine would ~~only~~ only be selected when P-20 was in process. This looks like a double check on P-20 and therefore not needed.

R-22

This routine is used in

P-34 }
P-35 }

It would only be called up in the listed programs if state vector update is desired, in which case P-20 would have to be in process. These programs can also be accomplished without state vector update. Concur with NAA

R 21

NAA felt that assumption 2 should be modified or amplified to decrease the possibility of losing marks due to high frequency of marks.

Either

1) Force computer to process marks faster than 1 each minute.

or 2) Emphasize that marks should be made at a rate not faster than 1 per minute.

P40 or P41

Thrusting
(SPS) or (ECs)

Problem in G₁ & N Displays

In case of Gimbal Hardover the action of going to MTVC on rotation controller blanks the register displays of TG, ΔV_x , ΔV_m . Since the SCS accelerometer is the EMS accel on the X axis, one does not know how much the out of plane errors have been.

This could be a critical situation if an out of plane burn were being made. A sudden gimbal hardover could cause one to "DE ORBIT" unintentionally. — since to get back into the prog, must go to "clear or fresh start", then P00 and then ^{pre} thrusting and thrusting Prog. and wait for 5 min lockout.

P51- IMU Orientation

NAA felt there should be some method where by the pilot can have displayed to him a coarse reference attitude for orientation.

This would involve a new routine for displaying a coarse inertial attitude.

NAA General Comments.

Programs do not give the capability or flexibility needed, and limit the crew in the use of the G & C system.

In answer to a question; if they (Bill Campbell) ~~would~~ had a choice in programming changes, they would: remove RO1 and RO2; many flags and interlocks; give the crew the capability to select any program at any time; provide the capability to fine align the IMU to any attitude; reduce the number of "proceeds"